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I. Introduction
Rising healthcare costs have had a devastating impact on many
American families in recent years.1 One of the main drivers of this national
problem is the price consumers must pay for prescription drugs.2 Although
rising prescription drug costs place a heavy burden on all individuals, they
are most harmful to those who cannot afford health insurance or those
dependent on prescription drugs due to chronic illness.3 Of particular
concern are the poor and the elderly, who are more prone to chronic
conditions that require long-term care.4 Without more affordable options,
these groups do not have access to many of the therapies they need in order
to sustain a healthy life, including the newer, more expensive prescription
drugs.5
1. See AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS STATEMENT: BRINGING
DOWN HEALTHCARE COSTS
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.ahip.org/
BoardofDirectorsStatements/ (stating that soaring healthcare costs force “[w]orking families
and seniors [to] face difficult choices between the basic necessities of living and needed
health care”).
2. See Dennis Cauchon, Drug Prices Jump Again While Other Health Costs Decline,
USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013, 8:09PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/02/13/price-of-a-prescription-rising-again/1918099/ (citing data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis that shows drug prices increased at twice the rate of inflation in 2012).
3. See Ron Claiborne & Jessica Hopper, Price of Brand-Name Drugs Soars, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/cost-brand-drugs-soars-hurting-elderlyamericans-fixed/story?id=11478210 (noting that those who cannot afford health insurance
are likely on fixed incomes and must bear the full cost of medical expenses out-of-pocket).
4. See Soonim Huh, et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Effects of Drug
Expenditures Among Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries, 43 HEALTH SERV. RES. 810, 811 (June
2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 2442248/pdf/hesr00430810.pdf (“Rapid growth of prescription drug expenditures is likely to disproportionately
influence the elderly because they are more dependent upon them than any other group, due
to high prevalence of chronic conditions that require long-term medications.”).
5. See The Commonwealth Fund, Prescription Drug Nonadherence: Elderly Adults,
THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Perfor
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One of the ways Americans have been able to minimize their
healthcare spending is through substituting less expensive generic
medications for more expensive patented branded pharmaceuticals.6
However, spending on prescription drugs remains high, suggesting that
generic substitution has not met its full potential.7 One reason for this
problem is arguably an active effort by drug manufacturers to keep generic
drugs from entering the market,8 leading to an artificial maintenance of high
drug prices for tens of millions of Americans.9 Drug manufacturers have
been able to accomplish this through the use of reverse payment or “payfor-delay” settlement agreements.
Reverse payment settlement agreements arise where a generic
manufacturer attempts to enter the market by producing a generic version of
a brand name drug.10 The manufacturer of the branded version files a
lawsuit for patent infringement, and the generic manufacturer defends the
suit on the ground that the patent is invalid or the generic drug does not
infringe the patent.11 Instead of litigating the patent dispute, the generic and
brand-name manufacturer strike a settlement agreement whereby the
generic manufacturer agrees not to bring a competing drug to market for an
agreed-upon period of time.12 In return, the brand-name drug manufacturer
mance-Snapshots/Unmet-Needs-for-Health-Care/Prescription-Drug-Nonadherence--ElderlyAdults.aspx (“More than one-quarter of seniors reported that they did not fill or adhere to a
prescription for cost-related reasons in 2003.”).
6. See David A. Mott & Richard R. Cline, Exploring Generic Drug Use Behavior:
The Role of Prescribers and Pharmacists in the Opportunity for Generic Drug Use and
Generic Substitution, 40 MEDICAL CARE 662, 663 (2002), available at http://www.
jstor.org/stable/3767620 (noting that spending on drugs can be reduced through the use of
prescription drugs due to the high cost differential between generic and brand-name drugs).
7. See Press Release, RAND Corporation, Financial Burden of Prescription Drugs is
Dropping, But Costs Remain a Challenge For Many Families (Feb. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/02/08/index1.html (stating that generics have help
decrease healthcare expenditures for Americans but prescription costs remain a challenge for
low-income individuals).
8. See U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, TOP-TWENTY PAY-FOR-DELAY
DRUGS, U.S. PIRG), available at http://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Top_Twenty_
Pay_For_DelayDrugs_USPIRG.pdf [hereinafter U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP]
(stating that pay-for-delay settlements has held back the introduction of many generic
drugs).
9. See generally Mott & Cline, supra note 6 (giving a brief overview of the negative
impact reverse payment settlement agreements can have on consumers through delayed
generic entry of key drugs).
10. 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELL. PROP. AND ANTITRUST LAW § 38:3 (2013).
11. See id. (stating that reverse payment settlement agreements arise out of patent
infringement suits).
12. See id. (stating that compensation is paid to the infringer “in return for the
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compensates the generic manufacturer, typically by a large monetary
payment.13 Although these agreements can avoid costly litigation, they can
also substantially harm competition and consumers. That is true where the
agreement delays the entry of a generic drug but the court would have
found the patent invalid or not infringed. Therefore, had litigation
continued, the generic would have been permitted to enter the market
earlier than permitted by the reverse payment agreement.14 Thus, reverse
payment agreements can provide a way for brand-name manufacturers with
invalid or non-infringed patents to stave off competition in the drug market,
potentially allowing the brand-name manufacturer to continue to charge
supracompetitive prices by leaving consumers without a cheaper generic
alternative.15 Because of their potential adverse effect on consumer
healthcare expenditures, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has made
ending reverse payment agreements one of its top priorities since the late
1990’s.16
If reverse payment settlement agreements have the potential to harm
consumers and competition, why haven’t the courts eliminated these
agreements altogether? While reverse payment agreements may run against
the antitrust policy of maximizing competition in the marketplace, holders
of valid, infringed patents see these payments as a way to exercise their
right under the patent laws to exclude others from infringing their patents
and to reduce litigation costs.17 If the patent is valid and a generic
infringer’s agreement to refrain from producing or selling its allegedly infringing product for
an agreed period ending on or before expiration of the patentee’s patent”).
13. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (discussing the basic structure of a
reverse payment agreement).
14. See discussion infra Parts II.B., III.
15. See Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comp. Pol’y, and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 2
(2013) (statement of George Slover, Consumers Union), available at
http://consumersunion.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/generic_drug_pay_for_delay_statem
ent_0813.pdf (stating that reverse payment settlements have been used to eliminate generic
entry, “thereby prolonging the period during which [brand-name drug makers] can charge
monopoly prices to consumers who need the drug and have no alternative”).
16. See Pay-For-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comp. Pol’y, and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 1
(2013)
(statement
of
the
Federal
Trade
Commission),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-pay-delay-deals-limiting-competition-and-costing/130723payfordelay.pdf.
17. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 761, 766–69 (2002) (discussing the fact that both antitrust law and patent law share the
same objective of increasing consumer welfare but their paths in achieving this goal often
diverge and conflict).
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manufacturer infringes on that patent, the patent holder should be able to
settle a patent infringement in lieu of undergoing time-consuming, costly,
and unpredictable patent litigation. Antitrust proponents, however, believe
that patent holders are using such settlements as a device to unlawfully
exclude competition based on an invalid or non-infringed patent.18
Given the widely divergent views held on the appropriate legal
framework for analyzing reverse payment agreements, such agreements
have been one of the most discussed antitrust topics over the past two
decades.19 The topic came to the forefront in the summer of 2013, when the
Supreme Court decided FTC v. Actavis.20 In Actavis, the Court was asked to
settle a circuit split about the antitrust standard that courts should apply in
determining the lawfulness of these types of agreements; that is, given their
potential anticompetitive effects, the appropriate depth of scrutiny for
determining the effect on competition of the agreements and thus their
lawfulness under the antitrust laws.21 Because reverse payment agreements
have the potential to restrain competition, the Court held that they should be
subjected to the “rule of reason” analysis.22 Prior to the Court’s decision,
most circuit courts of appeals used the more name-brand-manufacturerfriendly “scope-of-the-patent test,” whereby the settlement would be
unlawful only if the exclusion under the agreement exceeded the right of
exclusion provided by the patent laws.23 This would be the case in only
very limited situations and thus critics argued that reverse payment
settlement agreements were effectively per se legal, causing substantial
consumer harm.24
18. See HOLMES, supra note 10 (noting that patent holders believe that engaging in
these agreements falls within their right to exclude others from producing infringing
products while antitrust proponents believe these agreements go beyond the intended scope
of patent laws).
19. See Kenneth Glazer & Jenée Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard Cases
Even Under Good Law, 24 ANTITRUST 14, 14 (Spring 2010) (noting that “reverse payments
remain one of the most contentious areas of antitrust”).
20. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013) (holding that reverse
payment settlement agreements should be analyzed under rule of reason and tasked the
lower courts with developing “the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation”).
21. See discussion infra Part VII (discussing the details and implications of Actavis at
length).
22. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 at 2226 (2013) (declining to hold that reverse
payments are presumptively unlawful and therefore they should be analyzed under “rule of
reason” analysis).
23. See discussion infra Part VI.B (discussing the different antitrust standards lower
courts applied to reverse payment settlement agreements before Actavis was decided).
24. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
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Although the Actavis decision has been touted as a victory for
consumers and the FTC because reverse payment agreements will be
subjected to a more stringent antitrust standard than before, the general
consensus is that this ruling provided more questions than answers. Among
the questions most discussed is whether the Court intends for lower courts
to apply “full-blown” rule of reason analysis to these types of agreements.25
Although this topic will be discussed in the following sections, the most
important issue raised by Actavis for the purposes of this Note is how the
ruling will affect the cost of healthcare for consumers, especially the poor
and elderly, and the likelihood that legislation will be enacted in order to
adequately protect these groups.
Part II of this Note provides background to the concept of reverse
payment settlements, focusing on legislation passed in the mid-1980s that
inadvertently gave rise to these types of agreements. Part III examines the
impact reverse payment agreements have on competition, noting that these
agreements can have both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Part
IV addresses how anticompetitive reverse payments affect consumers,
particularly the poor and the elderly. Part V summarizes recent
congressional bills introduced to eliminate reverse payment settlement
agreements. Part VI provides an overview of how lower courts addressed
the legality of reverse payment before Actavis was decided. Part VII
discusses the Actavis decision and the major questions the Court created,
including the exact standard the Court expects lower courts to apply and
what constitutes a “large and unjustified” reverse payment as that phrase
was used by the Court. Part VIII discusses the possible implications of
Actavis on consumer welfare as well as the likelihood that congressional
action will take place to further reduce the prevalence of reverse payment
agreements. Part VIII also argues that recent changes in the national
healthcare landscape could also reduce the burden prescription drug costs
have on poor and elderly Americans. This Note concludes that the Actavis
decision should allow Americans greater access to needed prescription
drugs.

25. See infra Part VII.A–C (providing an extensive discussion of the standard adopted
by the Court in reverse payment cases and the most likely way lower courts will apply that
standard).
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II. Background: Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements and the HatchWaxman Act
A. Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
Competition in the pharmaceutical industry is difficult to maintain,
which is why patent protection is very important in ensuring new drugs are
brought to market.26 Pioneer drug companies are exposed to major risks
when deciding to develop new drug therapies because development requires
high sunk costs and extensive regulatory compliance.27 Competition could
prevent brand-name drug manufacturers from recouping the R&D and
regulatory costs associated with inventing a new drug and bringing it to
market, eliminating the incentive for manufacturers to develop new drugs
necessary to increase public welfare.28
Despite the importance of patent protection in this industry, Congress
found that competition in the pharmaceutical industry was wholly
inadequate. After 1962, congressional testimony revealed that there were
150 brand-name drugs off patent for which there was no generic
counterpart.29 For generic manufacturers, the time and money required to
bring a new drug to market was simply too great to induce the effort.30
Through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,31
also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to increase the
entry of low-cost generics by reducing the regulatory burdens required of
generic manufacturers in bringing a generic drug to market.32 Since its
26. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 251
(2012) (noting that patent protection is important in the pharmaceutical industry because it is
“one of the most cost- and time-intensive areas of technological innovation . . .”).
27. See id.
28. See id. (stating the importance of patent protection in the drug industry because,
“[i]dentifying a compound with possible therapeutic benefits is only the first of many slow
and incredibly expensive steps, and the cost of discovering, testing, and marketing new
drugs is extremely high and continues to rise”).
29. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (stating that no
generics were entering the market because “generic companies simply would not spend the
time and money doing the clinical trials to get to market, . . .”).
30. See id. at 194 (stating that, “[t]he robust generic drug industry owes its very
existence to the Act, . . .”).
31. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
32. See Morris, supra note 26, at 248 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore promotes
generic market entry by relieving almost all of the regulatory burdens for generic
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enactment, the Hatch-Waxman Act has had a significant impact on
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.33 Today, almost every topselling drug faces generic competition whereas there were only generic
equivalents available for 35% of brand-name drugs prior to HatchWaxman.34 Further, 70% of prescriptions today are filled by generics
whereas generics only comprised 15% of the pre-Hatch-Waxman
prescription drug market.35 The result has been millions of dollars in cost
savings for Medicaid and Medicare—and commercial health plans and
consumers—due to generic substitution programs.36
The Hatch-Waxman Act increased competition by streamlining the
process for generic drug approval, consequently creating an incentive for
generic manufacturers to enter the market.37 Prior to this Act, generic drug
manufacturers, like branded-drug manufacturers, had to submit and obtain
approval of a New Drug Application (NDA) before the FDA approved their
drug.38 Filing a NDA is an extremely costly and time-consuming process.39
Generic drug manufacturers were forced to submit clinical data verifying a
drug’s safety and efficacy even though a brand name manufacturer had
already undergone the NDA approval process using identical data for a
bioequivalent drug.40
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers are able to
skip this process by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),
manufacturers, as well as by helping generic manufacturers challenge the validity of brandname pharmaceutical patents that might be hindering such market entry.”).
33. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 14 (“The emergence of a
successful generic drug industry has often been attributed to the Act . . . .”).
34. Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act-25 Years Later: Keeping the
Pharmaceutical
Scales
Balanced,
PHARMACYTIMES
(Aug.
15,
2009),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809
/Generic-HatchWaxman-0809#sthash.kKlxbMSX.dpuf.
35. Id.
36. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., Extensions Of Intellectual Property Rights And
Delayed Adoption Of Generic Drugs: Effects On Medicaid Spending, 15 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1637, 1638 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/6/1637.full#ref-8
(“Several reports have detailed millions of dollars in cost savings achievable through
generic-substitution policies employed by government and private payers.”).
37. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 15 (stating that the approval
process was significantly streamlined because the Act allowed “generic manufacturers to
circumvent the lengthy and expensive NDA filing by filing instead an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA)”).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
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which allows the generic drug manufacturer to use the safety and efficacy
data gathered and submitted by the brand-name manufacturer to complete
its original NDA.41 The generic drug manufacturer need only supplement
the original NDA with data showing that the generic drug is the
“bioequivalent” of the already-approved brand-name drug.42 If approved, an
ANDA filer is given a 180-day exclusivity period in which no other generic
manufacturer can have an ANDA approved that covers the same drug.43
This exclusivity period can be very profitable for the “first filer.” It creates
a generic drug “bottleneck,” excluding other generics from the market, thus
allowing the first filer to charge a higher price than it otherwise would be
able do if other generics were allowed to enter the market.44
In order to maintain the balance between innovation and competition,
the Hatch-Waxman Act provides safeguards to protect the brand-name
manufacturer from infringement of its patent. For example, Congress
recognized that it takes a long time for the FDA to approve a drug after a
patent holder files the NDA for that drug.45 During this time period, the
patent holder is losing months off the patent’s life. The Hatch-Waxman Act
adds back one half of the patent life lost during this time period to the
exclusionary period of the patent.46 Also, the generic drug manufacturer
seeking approval through an ANDA must submit a certification 1) that the
drug is not covered by an existing patent, 2) that if there is a patent that the
patent has expired, 3) providing information regarding the expiration date
of such existing patent, and 4) that if there is an existing patent, the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed upon by the generic drug manufacturer.47
Once this “Paragraph IV” certification is filed, patent holders of brandname drugs may bring a patent-infringement claim against an ANDA filer
within forty-five days of the first filer’s ANDA filing if they believe the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(5)(b)(IV)(iv) (2012).
44. If other generics were allowed to enter the market during the exclusivity period,
the sole generic would be forced to lower its price to a competitive level, or else lose
consumers to the other generics willing to charge a lower price. Without competition, there
is no incentive for the generic to lower its price because consumers do not have a competitor
to turn to. See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 373 (2010).
45. See Morris, supra note 26, at 260.
46. See Id. (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act provides for restoration of patent term equal to
one-half of the time period from the start of human clinical trials to NDA approval and all of
the time spent during the NDA approval process itself.”).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
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generic drug infringes on their patent.48 This is colloquially called
“Paragraph IV litigation.” If a patent holder challenges the ANDA, the
approval of the ANDA is automatically stayed for thirty months.49
B. The Development of Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements
To understand how reverse payments can affect competition and
consumer drug prices, an explanation of how reverse payments develop is
necessary.50 As part of the “procompetitive thrust” of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the Act facilitates and encourages challenges to a patent’s validity.51
Aside from the valuable 180-day exclusivity period afforded to the first
filer, the generic challenger is also free to challenge an existing patent by
creating a patent-infringing generic with little risk. This is because, at best,
the subsequent challenge by the patent holder can be characterized as an
“artificial” patent infringement suit, as the generic manufacturer has neither
marketed nor sold an infringing drug before the suit is filed.52 Because the
generic manufacturer has not yet infringed on the patent holder’s patent, the
generic manufacturer is not at risk of being held liable for damages when
challenging a patent.53
The brand-name manufacturer must accept this challenge because the
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act almost requires the brand-name
manufacturer to bring a patent infringement suit against the generic, or else
lose its patent. If the brand-name manufacturer does not file suit, the
generic drug will enter the market immediately once its ANDA is

48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012).
49. Id. This “thirty-month” provision is particularly important in the context of reverse
payment settlements because it encourages patent holders to file suit and enjoy the thirtymonth stay rather than immediately lose the exclusivity of their patent.
50. The mechanics of reverse payment settlements can be difficult to grasp. For a
better understanding of this concept, see infra Part VI.B and for recent examples, see infra
Part VII.
51. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225–26 (2013) (noting that the HatchWaxman Act facilitates patent challenges and requires parties in a Paragraph IV dispute to
report the settlement agreement to the government).
52. See Robin P. Sumner & Melissa J. Hatch, A Turducken Task: How Actavis Invites
Relitigation of Patent Merits in Reverse Payment Cases, 29 No. 10 WESTLAW J. PHARM. 12
at *4 n.13 (Nov. 26, 2013) (noting that a generic challenger is not liable for damages
because it has not actually marketed an infringing product).
53. See id.
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approved,54 and the branded manufacturer will typically lose a substantial
volume of business.
The result is that the Hatch-Waxman Act achieved its goal of
increasing the number of patent challenges. But it also increased the
number of patent infringement suits filed.55 These patent infringement suits
often end in a settlement between the parties.56 The structure of these
settlements is quite unique because the patent holder pays off the patentinfringing generic manufacturer in return for the generic manufacturer’s
promise not to enter the market.57 The opposite direction in which these
payments flow is the reason they are called “reverse payment
settlements.”58
The antitrust concerns in reverse payments are two-fold. First, under a
reverse payment agreement, the brand-name manufacturer is able to
maintain monopoly power with a patent that may have been found invalid
or not infringed had litigation continued. Second, the generic manufacturer,
instead of bringing a competitive drug to market, essentially shares the
branded manufacturer’s profits resulting from its supracompetitive prices.59
These agreements not only have the effect of taking the first filer’s generic
out of the market, but they also prevent other generics from trying to enter
the market before the parties have settled.60 As a result, consumers are not
54. See id.
55. See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 443 (2008) (noting
that one of the intentions behind the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase challenges to brand
name drug companies’ patents before the expiration of such patents).
56. See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 367, 373–74 (“From 1992 to 2000, nearly forty
percent of litigations against the first ANDA filer resulted in a settlement.”).
57. See id. at 374 (listing a number of forms that reverse payment settlements typically
take). If, on the other hand, the patent would have been found valid and infringed upon had
litigation continued, the reverse payment would have no adverse effect on competition. See
also infra Part III.
58. These agreements take place in reverse because the patent holder bringing suit
against an alleged infringer (the generic manufacturer) pays the infringer rather than the
infringer paying the patent holder for their potentially infringing conduct. See HOLMES,
supra note 10.
59. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (stating that reverse
payment settlements have the effect of setting “prices at patentee-set levels, potentially
producing the full patent-related . . . monopoly return while dividing that return between the
challenged patentee and the patent challenger”).
60. Several provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act make this the case. First, subsequent
generic challengers have no incentive to bring additional challenges to a weak patent
because they cannot benefit from the 180-day exclusivity period. Because competing
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able to benefit from the cost savings they would have realized had the
generic entered the market and taken business from the brand-name
manufacturer.61 The generic’s entrance into the market would reduce the
branded manufacturer’s market power, likely forcing it to reduce its price to
compete with the lower-priced generic drug.
III. The Impact of Reverse Payments on Competition
As noted above, reverse payment settlement agreements can have
procompetitive effects by reducing litigation costs and allowing generics to
enter the market sooner than they otherwise would.62 But these agreements
also carry the major risk of stifling competition. The key indicators of the
effect a particular reverse payment will have on competition are the
strength of the underlying patent and whether, if the patent is valid, the
generic drug infringes it. If a patent is strong and infringed, a reverse
payment agreement that forces the generic manufacturer to delay entry into
the future but allows the generic to enter before the expiration of the patent
will not be anticompetitive or harm consumers.63 Without such an
agreement, the generic would not be able to enter the market until the
expiration of the patent. But under the agreement, the generic would be
allowed to enter into the market sooner than otherwise—a procompetitive
result.64 However, if the underlying patent is weak and likely to be found
generics are not likely to challenge the patent, they will wait until both parties have settled
their patent infringement claim before filing their own ANDA with the FDA. And like the
first filer they must wait approximately thirty months before the FDA gives its approval
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See id. at 2235.
61. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 15 (stating that reverse payments
allow the generic manufacturer and brand-name manufacturer to split monopoly profits,
profits that would have trickled down to consumers in the form of cost savings had the
generic been allowed to enter the market).
62. See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (stating that reverse payments can
have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects).
63. See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 376–77 (“If the patent is quite strong, and
likely to be found valid and infringed, then even a settlement with an agreed-upon entry date
well into the future, but before the patent’s expiration, may bring generic drugs to market
sooner than the expected outcome from continued litigation.”).
64. I believe this is a point many often ignore when they criticize the Supreme Court’s
decision in Actavis. Although reverse payments may result in higher prices for consumers,
many actually reduce drug prices by enabling generics to enter the market sooner. See, e.g.,
Alex Galvan, A Second Opinion on Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Why
Actavis Missed the Mark, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 586 (2014) (stating that the Court
should have applied quick-look analysis to reverse payments because they eliminate
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invalid or if the generic drug were non-infringing, a delayed entry would be
anticompetitive. The fact that reverse payment agreements can be
procompetitive or anticompetitive has led to extensive debate and
inconsistent court decisions over the last twenty years as to where these
agreements fit in antitrust law.65
IV. The Impact of Reverse Payments on Consumers
Although reverse payment settlements have the potential to be
procompetitive, it appears that the net result of these types of agreements is
a substantial loss to consumers. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
found that reverse payment agreements cost American consumers an
estimated $3.5 billion per year in savings because brand-name drugs are ten
times more expensive than their generic counterparts.66 Consumers are
prevented from enjoying these low-cost generics because reverse payment
agreements delay generic market entry by approximately seventeen
months.67 Therefore, if a consumer is forced to spend $300 per month for a
prescription drug when a marketable generic is available for $30, a delay
due to a reverse payment agreement of seventeen months would cost a
single consumer $4,950 over the delay period.68 A drug cost increase of
competition “and the consumer is left to pay the (high) price”).
65. See id. at 384 (“While the potential for patent settlements to be procompetitive is
generally recognized by economists, antitrust agencies, and the courts, ‘reverse payment’
settlements have generated extensive debate in recent years.”).
66. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federaltrade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. This figure seems to rest on
assumptions not fully explained in the FTC’s report. Most importantly, the report might be
making the assumption that all reverse payment agreements will cost consumers. It does not
fully explain instances where, had litigation continued, the patent would have been found
valid and infringed upon. In these cases, a settlement between the parties would result in the
generic entering the market sooner than it otherwise would have. See supra Part III.
However, the report does state that “generics prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation
ultimately resolved by a court decision between 1992 and June 2002,” indicating the
challenged patents are often invalid. See FED. TRADE COMM’N at 3.
67. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 4.
68. These figures are based on a hypothetical generic drug costing $300 per month
used by the FTC staff in the making of this report. However, the report cited by the FTC
highlights twenty popular brand name drugs affected by reverse payments. It shows that a
brand name drug costing $300 per month is not unusual and the cost of its generic
counterpart on average is ten times less than the brand name counterpart, but can be as much
as thirty-three times cheaper. See id.
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almost $5,000 would be difficult for many Americans to stomach;
particularly considering that in 2012 over half of elderly Medicare
recipients had annual incomes lower than $22,500.69
Even more concerning is the fact that these reverse payments are
particularly harmful to historically underrepresented Americans,
specifically the poor and the elderly. These groups are most affected by
inflated drug prices because they are least able to afford medication and the
most at-risk for chronic medical conditions.70 Further, Americans who are
elderly or uninsured are much more likely to forgo needed prescriptions due
to cost and unavailability.71 In fact, according to the AARP, “having a
generic option is often the difference between having access to a healthcare
treatment and not having any treatment option at all.”72 The harsh reality is
that many Americans need generic drugs in order to stay alive.73 To further
exacerbate the problem, the need for prescription drugs is steadily
increasing and spending on national healthcare has quadrupled in the last
decade and a half.74
Reverse payment settlements have also proven to be a major burden on
the national healthcare system. A study conducted by the U.S. Public
Interest Research Group (U.S. PIRG) found that reverse payments affect the
69. See 10 Years Later: A Look at the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Commission on Aging, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement by
Robert G. Romasco, AARP President), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/04_Romasco_5_22_131.pdf.
70. See Brief for AARP, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at *1, FTC v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2013) (No. 12-416) (“Affordable
prescription medication is particularly important to the older population which, because of
its higher rates of chronic and serious health conditions, has experienced an increasing rate
of prescription drug use.”).
71. See Ellyn R. Boukus & Emily R. Carrier, Americans’ Access to Prescription
Drugs Stabilizes, 2007-2010, HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE (2011), available at
http://hschange.com/CONTENT/1264/1264.pdf (“In 2010, those with incomes below 200%
of poverty—$44,100 for a family of four—were 3.4 times more likely to report drug access
problems as those earning 400% of poverty or more . . . .”).
72. Brief for AARP, supra note 70, at *5.
73. See Alicia I. Hogges-Thomas, An American Drug Problem: Reclaiming
Consumers’ Rights Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 37 VT. L. REV. 737, 737 (2013) (“There
are Americans who need their prescription drugs to stay alive.”).
74. See Brief for AARP, supra note 70, at *2. One could argue that an increase in
spending on healthcare can be attributed to the dramatic development of medical technology
that has reduced the negative effects of some diseases. However, American spending on
healthcare continues to be much higher than what is spent in other developed countries. And
this high cost has not translated to longer life expectancy compared to countries like Canada
and many European countries. Thomas F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of
Healthcare, 13 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (April 2014).
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availability of drugs used to remedy a wide range of chronic medical
conditions, from cancer and heart disease to bacterial infections and
depression.75 In total, reverse payment agreements have adversely affected
142 brand-name drugs since 2005.76 Further, brand-name drug sales of
these drugs during the time period in which generics were not allowed to
enter the market has been estimated at $98 billion.77 Among those drugs
most affected are drugs commonly prescribed to elderly patients including
Cardizem (a calcium channel blocker), Effexor (an antidepressant), Lipitor
(a lipid lowering agent), K-Dur (a potassium replacement therapy), and
Sinemet (an anti-Parkinson’s therapy).78 The Congressional Budget Office
found that if generics were allowed to enter the market sooner, they would
save Medicare billions of dollars per year.79
V. Congressional Action Proposed to Stop Reverse Payment Settlements
Over the last five years, several bills that have been introduced in
Congress aimed at eliminating reverse payment agreements, but all have
stalled in the legislative process.80 Despite this lack of success, two bills
75. Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 4
(2013) (statement of Mike Russo, Federal Program Director for U.S. PIRG), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-23-13RussoTestimony.pdf.
76. See U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 8.
77. See Id. (“Combined, these brand-name drug companies have made an estimated
$98 billion in total sales of these drugs while the generic versions were delayed.”).
78. Data gathered by comparing the most popular drugs affected by reverse payment
settlement agreements and the most common drugs prescribed to elderly patients. See id.;
see also Drugs Commonly Prescribed to Elderly, HOMEMEDS.ORG (last visited Feb. 30,
2014), available at http://www.homemeds.org/images/medialibrary/0620A6A37F028F33FE
DC05FC1272963D.pdf.
79. See 10 years later: A Look at the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: Hearing
Before The Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Max
Richtman, National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare), available at
http://www.ncpssm.org/PublicPolicy/LettersTestimony/Documents/ArticleID/1158/10-YearsLater-A-Look-at-the-Medicare-Prescription-Drug-Program (stating that if the FTC were able
to prevent reverse payment settlements from occurring, it would save Medicare $11 billion
over the next 10 years).
80. See Hogges-Thomas, supra note 73, at 738 (citing four bills that have been
introduced but stalled: America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th
Cong. § 2563 (2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong.
(2009) (died in committee and reintroduced as S. 27 on January 25, 2011); Drug Price
Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2012)).
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were reintroduced in 2013 in an attempt to remedy the anticompetitive
harm reverse payments can cause, either by eliminating reverse payments
altogether or amending certain key provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act.81
To date, no new bills have been introduced in 2014.
Sen. Amy Klobuchar introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act (PAAG Act) in February 2013, which aims to “prohibit brand
name drug companies from compensating generic drug companies to delay
the entry of a generic drug into the market.”82 The bill notes that generic
drugs are substantially less expensive than brand-name drugs and that the
Hatch-Waxman Act has facilitated the prevention of entry by low-cost
generic drugs.83 The PAAG Act would create a rebuttable presumption that
all reverse payment agreements “have anticompetitive effects and [are]
unlawful.”84 Courts can consider several enumerated factors when
determining whether the parties have successfully rebutted this
presumption, including the remaining lifetime of the patent involved and
the value to consumers of competition in the relevant drug market.85
In March of 2013, Sen. Al Franken introduced another bill addressing
reverse payments, the Fair and Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act
(FAIR Generics Act).86 This bill proposes a slightly more patent-friendly
solution to reverse payments than the PAAG Act; if passed, it will revise
the “first-filer” definition by only awarding the 180-day exclusivity period
to any ANDA applicant that has not entered into a “disqualifying
agreement.”87 The bill defines a disqualifying agreement as an agreement
where the applicant agrees with a brand-name manufacturer not to seek
approval of its application or market its drug before the life of the patent in
question expires.88 The bill also attempts to provide more clarity regarding
litigation risk for generic manufacturers and brand name companies by
requiring brand name companies to decide whether to file an infringement
action within the 45-day window provided in the Hatch-Waxman Act.89
81. Both bills introduced are bills that have previously failed somewhere along the
legislative process. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong.
(2013); see also FAIR Generics Act, S. 504, 113th Cong. (2013).
82. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013).
83. Id. at §2(a)(4)–(6).
84. Id. at §28(a)(2).
85. Id. at §28(b).
86. FAIR Generics Act, S. 504, 113th Cong. (2013).
87. Id. at §3(a)(1)(vii)(II).
88. Id. at §3(a)(1)(vii)(II).
89. Id. at §3(b)(7).
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VI. Analysis of Reverse payments Pre-Actavis
A. Antitrust Standards: A Primer

Reverse payment agreements may have procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects depending on the specific facts. For this reason, the
most controversial aspect of reverse payments is the depth of antitrust
scrutiny that courts should apply to determine their effect on competition.
Consumers should be concerned about the court’s decision on this issue,
because the antitrust standard courts end up applying affects the number of
reverse payments permitted to squeeze by antitrust condemnation.
The FTC has challenged reverse payment agreements under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce.”90 Unfair methods of competition
under section 5 include agreements that would violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain
competition.91 In determining whether an agreement unreasonably restraints
competition, courts and the FTC generally apply one of three standards:
1) the per se rule, 2) “quick-look” analysis, or 3) rule of reason analysis.92
The standard of review the court applies depends on the nature of the
conduct in question and how likely it is that the type of conduct under
challenge has anticompetitive effects.93 If it is a type of conduct that is so
inherently anticompetitive “as to warrant perfunctory antitrust
condemnation without inquiry into [its] actual market impact or possible
competitive justification,” it will be deemed per se illegal.94 Because the per
se rule establishes a conclusive presumption of unlawfulness regardless of
the conduct’s actual effect and thus does not permit the defendant to rebut

90. Unfair Methods of Competition Unlawful; Prevention by Commission, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (2012).
91. See Robert E. Entwisle & Daniel K. Storino, United States: The Uncertain Reach
Of Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act, MONDAQ (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/305416/Trade+Regulation+Practices/The+Uncertain+
Reach+Of+Section+5+Of+The+Federal+Trade+Commission+Act (“Although not expressly
authorized to enforce the Sherman Act, the FTC reaches such conduct through Section
5, . . .”).
92. See generally WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW
HANDBOOK § 2:9 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) (providing a thorough discussion of the various
antitrust standards and the specific circumstances when each is used).
93. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the category
of analysis courts use is determined by its potential competitive effects).
94. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:10.
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the presumption of illegality, it applies only in rare circumstances.95
Agreements that have been deemed per se unlawful include horizontal price
fixing and market allocation agreements.96
If the conduct is not inherently anticompetitive but instead has both
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, it will be analyzed under the
more flexible “rule of reason” standard.97 Under full-blown rule of reason
analysis, the court weighs the conduct’s procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects and asks whether the procompetitive effects, i.e., increased
efficiencies or consumer benefits, outweigh the decrease in competition that
result from such conduct.98
Between the per se rule and rule of reason analysis lies a “continuum”
of standards that borrow approaches from both per se and rule of reason
analysis for conduct that does not fit in either of the two extremes.99 For
example, the “quick look” or truncated rule of reason is used where the
defendant’s conduct is not per se illegal, yet the conduct’s apparent
anticompetitive effects makes it unnecessary to go through full-blown rule
of reason analysis.100 For the quick-look rule to apply, “the conduct at issue
and context in which it arises must have likely anticompetitive effects that
are so intuitively obvious as to be clear without a detailed market analysis,

95. Id. at § 2:9.
96. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Examples of
agreements that have been held unlawful pursuant to the per se rule include horizontal price
fixing, output limitations, market allocation, and group boycotts.”).
97. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:10.
98. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“[T]he
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.”). In rule of reason analysis,
courts typically employ a burden-shifting framework. The plaintiffs bear an initial burden to
demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition
in the relevant market. If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the burden shifts to the
defendants to offer evidence of the procompetitive effects of their agreement, and if the
defendants can provide such proof, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove that any
legitimate competitive benefits offered by defendants could have been achieved through less
restrictive means. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30
(2010). Ultimately, the factfinder will weigh the effects and determine which effect
predominates. If, on balance, the conduct has significant anticompetitive effects, it violates
section 1 of the Sherman Act or, if the action is brought by the FTC, section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Id.
99. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:9 (discussing other standards
that are used when conduct is “difficult to place under either the per se or the rule of reason
banner”).
100. Id. at § 2:10.
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i.e., from just a ‘quick look.’”101 Under the quick-look rule, the plaintiff
need not prove that the conduct has actual anticompetitive effects—they are
presumed. But the defendants are permitted to offer procompetitive
justifications for their conduct. If they do, the court must balance the
effects; but if not, the conduct is condemned without the plaintiffs having to
define the relevant market or establish the defendant’s market power.102
B. Antitrust Standards Applied to Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis, circuits applied
varying standards to reverse payment settlements. In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation,103 a case from the Sixth Circuit, involved an agreement
between Hoescht Marion Roussel Inc., the manufacturer of the prescription
drug Cardizem CD (Cardizem), and Andrx Pharmaceuticals (Andrx), a
company that would produce the generic version of that drug.104 Pursuant to
a reverse settlement agreement, Cardizem would pay Andrx $10 million per
year and in exchange, Andrx would refrain from marketing their drug even
after it had received FDA approval.105 The Sixth Circuit determined that at
its core, the reverse payment agreement was a horizontal restraint on trade
and was thus per se unlawful.106 Therefore, the court held that the per se
rule should apply.107
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, however, rejected the per se rule
and instead held that a reverse payment is valid as long as competition is
restrained only within the exclusionary scope of the patent.108 That is, the
101. Id.
102. See id. (stating that most circuit court of appeals employ a burden shifting
framework like that typically used in rule of reason analysis).
103. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the reverse payment agreement in question was “a horizontal market allocation
agreement and, as such, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding
state antitrust laws”).
104. Id. at 899.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 908.
107. See id. at 900 (“The Agreement . . . is a horizontal market allocation agreement
and, as such, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding state
antitrust laws.”).
108. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006)
(adopting the question presented in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076
(11th Cir. 2005) of whether the “exclusionary effects of the agreement” exceed the “scope of
the patent’s protection”).
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reverse payment would not be illegal if the agreement not to enter the
market ended before the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expired.109
These courts noted that to expose these types of reverse payment
agreements to antitrust scrutiny would chill settlement.110 It also runs in the
face of the principle that a patent holder has a right to exclusion that is
largely immune from antitrust liability.111 These courts instead held that a
patent is presumptively lawful absent sham or baseless litigation if the
exclusion does not exceed the scope of the exclusion permitted under the
patent laws.112
The Third Circuit disagreed with the scope-of-the-patent test because
it institutes an almost irrebuttable presumption that the patent is valid.113 In
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation,114 the court decided that such a
presumption is unfounded, as many patents issued by the Patent and Trade
Office are later found to be invalid or not infringed in paragraph IV
litigation.115 Further, there are strong public policy grounds for allowing
first filers to challenge weak patents; patents should be a limited exception
to the general rule that ideas and innovation should be able to flow freely
throughout an industry.116 Given these public policy concerns, the Third
109. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that a reverse payment is presumptively
lawful absent sham or baseless litigation if the exclusion does not exceed the scope of the
exclusion permitted under the patent laws), Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
110. See Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1064 (citing Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at
1309) (stating if the agreement is no more broad than the exclusionary scope of the patent,
there is no need for these agreements to undergo antitrust scrutiny).
111. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1307 (stating that patent immunity can only be
pierced if “the patentee enforced a patent with the knowledge that the patent was procured
by fraud on the Patent Office”).
112. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09 (“In such a case, so long as the patent litigation
is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement
in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”).
113. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e take
issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent
validity.”).
114. See id. at 218 (holding that the scope of the patent test is inappropriate and
directed the lower courts to apply quick look analysis to reverse payment cases).
115. See id. at 215 (“Many patents issued by the PTO are later found to be invalid or
not infringed, and a 2002 study conducted by the FTC concluded that, in Hatch–Waxman
challenges made under paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent
of the time.”).
116. See id. (“This practical analysis is supported by a long line of Supreme Court cases
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Circuit rejected the scope-of-the-patent test because it fails “to protect
consumers from unjustified monopolies by brand name drug
manufacturers.”117 Instead, the court held that the quick look standard
applied, whereby the reverse payment could be used as prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition.118
VII. FTC v. Actavis
Given the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in FTC v. Actavis, a reverse payment settlement agreement
decision from the Eleventh Circuit with facts similar to those in other
reverse payment settlement cases. In 1999, Solvay Pharmaceuticals
(Solvay) filed an NDA with the FDA for a new brand-name drug called
AndroGel.119 Later that year, petitioner Actavis (known as Watson
Pharmaceuticals at the time) filed an ANDA with the FDA to begin
manufacturing a generic version of AndroGel.120 Actavis, along with
Paddock Laboratories (Paddock), another generic manufacturer, certified
under Paragraph IV that Solvay’s patent was invalid.121 Solvay then
initiated Paragraph IV patent infringement litigation against Actavis,
Paddock, and the generic manufacturer Par (a pharmaceutical company
working with Paddock).122
Actavis’s drug was approved and was granted the 180-day first-filer
exclusivity period.123 However, in 2006 all parties settled the patent
litigation. Under the settlement, Actavis agreed not to bring its generic drug
to market until sixty-five months before Solvay’s patent expired.124
Therefore, their agreement was within the exclusionary scope of Solvay’s
patent. Actavis also agreed to market AndroGel to urologists during the
agreement period.125 In return, Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to
recognizing that valid patents are a limited exception to a general rule of the free
exploitation of ideas.”).
117. Id. at 217.
118. Id. at 218.
119. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
125. Id.
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the respondent generic manufacturers, including an annual payment of $19
to $30 million a year to Actavis for nine years.126 The FTC subsequently
filed a lawsuit against Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and Par under §5 of the
FTC Act for agreeing to share Solvay’s monopoly profits and abandoning
their patent challenges.127
Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the FTC’s complaint. Applying the scope-of-the-patent test, it
held that the reverse payment was valid because the agreement not to enter
Solvay’s market expired before the life of the patent.128 The FTC urged the
Court to apply the quick-look standard.129 They recognized that there are
“possible legitimate justifications for the payment” but reverse payments
are similar to conduct that has received per se treatment.130 Respondents, on
the other hand, urged the Court to uphold the scope of the patent test citing
the longstanding principle that a “patentee is exempt from the antitrust laws
so long as the patentee does not use its patent to reach ‘beyond the limits of
the patent monopoly.’”131 The Court decided that the quick-look rule was
not appropriate, as reverse payments do not clearly have anticompetitive
effects.132
The Supreme Court also rejected the scope of the patent test,
determining that reverse payments “can sometimes violate antitrust
laws.”133 For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the
FTC’s complaint to proceed.134 The Court resolved the contentious circuit
split by rejecting the quick look approach, the per se rule, and the scope of

126. Id.
127. Id. at 2229–30.
128. Id. at 2227.
129. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298
(11th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-12729), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/12416tsUnitedStates
.pdf.
130. Id. at 33.
131. Brief for Respondent at 15, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298
(11th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-12729) (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
308 (1948)), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/12416-Brief-for-Solvay-Pharmaceuticals.pdf.
132. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (stating that reverse
payments do not meet the requisite criterion which would allow the Court to adopt a
presumptive standard in favor of rule of reason).
133. Id. at 2227.
134. Id.
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the patent test, holding that reverse payments should be analyzed under rule
of reason.135
A. The Court’s Guidance to Analyzing Reverse Payments (Or Lack
Thereof)
The Court made several general observations justifying its holding in
Actavis that reverse payment settlements should be assessed under the rule
of reason standard and also attempted to shed some light on how the lower
courts should apply it.136 First, the Court recognized that reverse payments
can be anticompetitive because they sometimes allow patent holders to
enjoy market exclusivity even if their patents are invalid or not infringed by
the generic entrant.137 Second, the anticompetitive effects of these
settlements at least sometimes outweigh their potential benefits of reducing
litigation costs and decreasing uncertainty.138 Third, the Court claimed that
the size of the reverse payment can be a strong indicator of the market
power of the brand name manufacturer, and thus its ability to cause
anticompetitive harm.139 Fourth, the Court stated that applying the rule of
reason to reverse payments is feasible because it will often not be necessary
to test the patent’s validity.140 This statement is in response to the dissent’s
main concern that assessing the patent’s validity, and whether the generic
infringes in each case, will be complex and lead to uncertainty.141 Lastly,
the Court noted some alternatives the parties could use to settle the
infringement suit in lieu of reverse payments, including allowing the
generic drug manufacturer to simply enter the market before the expiration
of the patent.142 The Court recognized that cash settlements might be more
135. See id. at 2237 (rejecting the FTC’s argument that reverse payments should be
analyzed under the quick look rule instead of rule of reason because reverse payments are
not clearly unlawful).
136. See id. at 2234 (“[F]ive sets of considerations lead us to conclude that the FTC
should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.”).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See discussion infra Part VII.B. The Court states that “the ‘size of the payment
from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of
power’—namely, the power to charge prices higher than the competitive level.” See FTC v.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 351 (3d ed. 2012)).
140. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013)
141. Id.
142. Id.

FTC V. ACTAVIS: ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION

141

beneficial to the settling parties but noted that if the only reason a cash
settlement is beneficial is because it allows the parties to split monopoly
profits, the reverse payment agreement is unlawful.143
B. How Should Lower Courts Apply Actavis?
Although the Court’s decision to adopt the rule of reason can be
considered a victory for consumers because all reverse payment agreements
are now subject to antitrust scrutiny, the Court punted the issue of how to
apply this standard to the lower courts.144 As a result, the decision leaves
many unanswered questions.145 The first is whether the Court actually
expects lower courts to adopt full-blown rule of reason analysis. Some
argue that a number of the Court’s observations suggest a framework more
indicative of a quasi-rule of reason/quick look standard.146 The Court
decided that testing the validity of the underlying patent would not be
necessary because the size of the reverse payment is a “strong indicator” of
the severity of its economic effects.147 In traditional rule of reason analysis,
the plaintiff must initially prove that the conduct has anticompetitive effects
either through direct evidence (i.e. supracompetitive prices or decreased
output or quality) or circumstantial evidence (i.e. a showing that the
defendant has sufficient market power to bring about anticompetitive
harm).148 In Actavis, the Court established an initial presumption that the
conduct is anticompetitive due to the unreasonable size of the reverse

143. Id.
144. See id. at 2238 (2013) (“We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of
the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
145. See Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse Payment Settlements-The Agenda for Courts
and the Legislature After the Supreme Court’s Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 105, 119 (2013) (stating that although the Court held that rule of reason analysis was
appropriate in reverse payment cases, “[t]he exact shape of the Supreme Court’s new
approach is much less clear”).
146. See Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the
Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner 10 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reversepayment-cases/130926actavis.pdf (noting the “general proposition that Actavis appears to
direct lower courts to apply the rule-of-reason with a relatively light touch in the reverse
payment context”).
147. Id.
148. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the balance shifting
framework employed in rule of reason analysis).
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payment, eliminating the need to prove market power or provide direct
economic evidence.149
Not requiring the lower courts to determine the strength of the patent
would provide an enormous benefit in the form of efficiency and cost
savings. First, by allowing the size of the payment to take the place of
testing the patent’s validity, the lower courts can avoid deciding the major
patent law questions. Lower courts often complain about being forced to
litigate a patent claim within an antitrust claim because of the
administrative and conceptual difficulties associated such a task.150 Further,
litigating the validity and infringement issues imposes heavy burdens on the
courts.151 Patent and antitrust are two areas of law where litigation takes an
enormous amount of time.152 Both patent and antitrust litigation also
heavily rely on expensive economic and industry experts. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit stated in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals153 that the
reverse payment litigation resulted in “mountains of evidence—when the
lawsuit settled, more than 40 depositions had been taken and one side alone
had produced more than 350,000 pages of documents.”154 And even if the
expert testimony is given and the facts are laid out, it is still often very
difficult to determine the strength of the patent in part because some patent
holders are unsure of the strength of their patent themselves.155
Despite the potential benefits of relying on the size of the reverse
payment, most practitioners and scholars have concluded that the Court was
incorrect when it stated that the size of the settlement can replace litigating
149. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (stating that the Court in Actavis found
that the size of the reverse payment could indicate the anticompetitive effect the settlement
agreement would have on the pharmaceutical market).
150. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *4 (“Lower courts have long recognized
that the ‘turducken task’ of litigating the merits of a patent case within an antitrust case is
conceptually and administratively difficult . . . .”).
151. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *4.
152. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675,
692 (2010) (citing a Georgetown University study that found the average antitrust case takes
three times longer that other civil federal cases from claim to judgment).
153. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that a reverse payment settlement agreement is valid absent sham
as long as it meets the scope of the patent test).
154. See id. at 1314.
155. See Tania Khatibifar, Note, The Need for A Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust
Review to Evaluate Reverse Payment Settlements, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1351, 1393 (2013) (“Evaluating the strength of a patent is difficult to pinpoint with
precision and may be unknowable to the patentee itself, . . .”).
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the patent’s validity.156 Determining the appropriateness of a reverse
payment necessitates assessing the subjective opinion of the parties
regarding their expected success in litigation and therefore their beliefs on
the strength of the underlying patent.157 Therefore, in assessing the
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement, the central issue
should be determining the validity of the patent and whether the generic
would infringe.158 In fact, FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright, in addressing
the issues surrounding the Actavis decision, stated that “it would be
surprising if courts summarily did away with the question of patent validity
as part of their analysis altogether.”159
Presuming that a patent is invalid when a large reverse payment is
involved also ignores the fact that reverse payments may be used even
when the patent is valid. A patent holder may be extremely confident about
its validity but may be willing to pay a large sum of money to eliminate the
risk that, if put before a jury, the patent would be found invalid.160 By
ordering the lower courts to proceed through rule of reason analysis without
testing the patent’s validity, the Court takes a strong defense from the
patent holder.161 Chief Justice Roberts highlights this point in his dissenting
opinion:
156. See, e.g., Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *2 (noting that “careful consideration
also calls into question the high court’s assurances that the parties will be able to avoid
relitigating the patent case they were trying to settle”); see also infra note 159 and
accompanying text, and Rahul Guha, et. al, Evaluating Reverse Payment Settlements After
Actavis, LAW360 (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/
451286/evaluating-reversepayment-settlements-after-actavis (arguing that “efforts by a
plaintiff to avoid litigating the underlying merits of the patent litigation should prove
unsuccessful”).
157. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *3 (“Any court considering whether a
settlement delayed competition must determine the probabilistic entry date had the parties
continued to litigate.”).
158. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 228 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Pooler, J., dissenting) (“[I]n assessing the reasonability of a Hatch–Waxman settlement, I
would rely primarily on the strength of the patent as it appeared at the time at which the
parties settled . . . .”).
159. Wright, supra note 146, at 12.
160. See Jeffrey M. Cross et al., The Supreme Court Adopts the Rule of Reason In
Antitrust Challenges to Reverse-Payment Patent Settlements: Now what?, 21 WESTLAW J.
ANTITRUST 6 (Oct. 16, 2013) (“[E]ven if a patent holder is 95 percent confident that the
patent is valid, it might pay a good deal of money to rid itself of a 5 percent chance of a
finding of invalidity.”).
161. See Rahul Guha et al., Evaluating Pay-For-Delay Deals after FTC v. Actavis,
LAW360 (June 29, 2013), available at http://www.pbwt.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
Evaluating%20Pay-For-Delay%20Deals%20after%20FTC%20v%20Actavis_Law360_2013.pdf.
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[T]he defendant (patent holder) will want to use the validity of his patent
as a defense . . . . I therefore don’t see how the majority can conclude
that it won’t normally be “necessary to litigate patent validity to answer
the antitrust question,” . . . unless it means to suggest that the defendant
(patent holder) cannot raise his patent as a defense in an antitrust suit.
But depriving him of such a defense—if that’s what the majority means
to do—defeats the point of the patent, which is to confer a lawful
monopoly on its holder.162

In some cases, reverse payments are the only rational choice. Patent
infringement litigation is often unpredictable and the costs associated with
going all the way through a patent litigation are much more than the costs
the defendant endures in such litigation.163 Analysis of reverse payments
must account for these circumstances.

C. How Would You Calculate the Size of the Settlement?
If lower courts do in fact use the size of the settlement as a surrogate
for the validity of the patent, the question then becomes at what amount a
settlement will be deemed large and unjustified.164 There have been several
different approaches offered since Actavis was decided. In Actavis, the
Court suggested the likelihood of a reverse payment’s illegality could be
determined by comparing its size to the expected litigation costs.165
However, this approach suffers from a major shortcoming: it would be
impossible to estimate the parties’ litigation costs without first determining
the likely outcome of patent litigation, which in turn includes assessing the
validity of the patent.166

162. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
163. See Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose
to Pay Generics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of the Asymmetric
Risks in Litigation, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19, 19 (2011) (stating that due to the
asymmetric information inherent in patent litigation reverse payments can be “a conscious
business decision based on risk management”).
164. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *3 (noting that Actavis presented this
question without providing an answer).
165. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236, (noting that a reverse payment may not be
anticompetitive if it “amount[s] to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation
expenses saved through the settlement”).
166. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (discussing the reason why
determining whether a payment is unreasonable includes assessing the validity of the
patent).
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A second possibility is to compare the size of the settlement to a fixed
benchmark.167 The dissent in Actavis points to one study that estimates the
cost of reverse payment settlement litigation in the neighborhood of $10
million.168 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp believes this would be a useful
benchmark to begin with, as this number is slightly higher than patent
litigation generally.169 Once this benchmark is established, the parties can
then dispute whether there are extenuating circumstances to justify a higher
or lower number.170 Although not without its critics,171 this approach seems
far more feasible than attempting to estimate the expected litigation costs in
each case. If courts do decide to use the size of the reverse payment in lieu
of testing the validity of the patent, the fixed benchmark is the logical
approach, as long as courts account for circumstances specific to each case.
The most likely answer to the question of how lower courts will treat
reverse payments post-Actavis is they will initially apply something more
akin to full-blown rule of reason, using the size of the reverse payment as
one of many factors in determining the potential adverse effect it has on
competition and consumers. The initial burden will rest with the plaintiffs
to show that the agreement has an adverse effect on competition. The
plaintiff, whether it is the government or a private party, will have to show
that the agreement delayed entry of the generic drug into the market past an
expected entry date. Analyzing the strength of the patent, the size of the
payment, and the expected litigation costs if litigation were to continue will
prove the anticompetitive effect.
If the plaintiff is able to show that the payment has the potential of
having an adverse effect on competition, the defendant drug manufacturers
can offer evidence of the procompetitive effects of the agreement. As
167. See Wright, supra note 146, at 12.
168. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citing MARC GOODMAN ET AL., MORGAN STANLEY, QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT FROM
AUTHORIZED GENERICS 9 (2004)).
169. Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 27 (2014).
170. See id. at 27 (“A good approach would be to start with a presumptive number of
about [$10 million], letting the parties dispute whether special factors in their case justify a
number that is higher or lower.”).
171. See Wright, supra note 146, at 13 (“[S]imply pulling a number out of the air to
serve as a benchmark may not allow courts to understand the important dynamics at play in a
specific case and would fly in the face of antitrust doctrine’s increasing preference for
economic substance over formal distinctions.”); see also Barry C. Harris et al., Activating
Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST 83, 83 (Spring 2014) (stating that using
expected litigation costs as a benchmark is essentially adopting the “quick look” approach;
the approach expressly rejected by the Court).
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discussed above, the manufacturer could offer evidence that the payment
was given in order to avoid costly litigation or the payment is indicative of
the branded manufacturer’s subjective opinion of the likelihood of winning
its patent infringement suit after assessing the risk of litigation. The burden
will then shift back to the plaintiff to show that there were less restrictive
means of achieving those competitive benefits, including allowing the
generic manufacturer to enter the market in lieu of a cash settlement. The
dissent in Actavis, however, is skeptical of the early-entry solution, as it
may reduce the chances the parties will decide to settle because they have
less with which to bargain.172
Although a lengthy rule of reason analysis may be required initially,
lower courts may be able to adopt a more truncated rule of reason analysis
given a period of “economic learning and experience . . . .”173 This is the
kind of experience the FTC would argue courts have already developed.174
In Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,175 a case involving an ancillary restraint
on competition between Polygram and Warner Communications, the D.C.
Circuit endorsed the Commission’s view that some conduct can be held
presumptively unlawful if the anticompetitive effects are “obvious from the
nature of the challenged conduct.”176 This same case-specific approach can
be eventually applied to reverse payment agreements. Although the Court
in Actavis has found that evidence is not yet strong enough to completely
condemn reverse payment agreements, new economic evidence may arise
allowing courts to find a presumption of illegality in certain cases.177

172. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2247 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority assures
us, with no support, that everything will be okay because the parties can settle by simply
negotiating an earlier entry date for the generic drug manufacturer . . . . But it’s a matter of
common sense, confirmed by experience, that parties are more likely to settle when they
have a broader set of valuable things to trade.”).
173. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
174. See supra Part VII (noting that the FTC argued that the Court should adopt the
quick look approach, indicating that courts have already had two decades of experience
dealing with the effects reverse payments have on competition).
175. See Polygram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d at 31 (finding that an ancillary restraint on
competition engaged in by two record companies, although not per se illegal, was
presumptively unlawful).
176. Id. at 36.
177. See Wright, supra note 146, at 14 (“Although it is clear the Supreme Court does
not believe the existing evidence presented to it by the Commission and amici concerning
the competitive effects of reverse payment agreements is sufficient to draw such conclusions
today, new evidence may permit a properly tailored case-specific presumption in the
future.”).
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VIII. Post-Actavis Implications on Drug Prices and Consumer Welfare
Actavis holds that the rule of reason applies to reverse payment
settlement agreements, rejecting the in-effect “safe harbor” for agreements
permitting the generic to enter prior to the patent’s expiration date.178
Although the effect of this decision on future reverse payment litigation has
been discussed at length, an important question still remains; will the
Court’s decision have an appreciable impact on drug prices and thus reduce
healthcare costs for consumers? Some argue that it will. On the day Actavis
was decided, the New York Attorney General exclaimed that “[t]oday’s
ruling is a victory for millions of Americans who depend on generic drugs
to treat illness and pain.”179 The AARP issued a press release stating that
Actavis was a win for consumers because it should stop excessively
extended patent monopolies that create costs which trickle through our
national healthcare system and burden those who need to treat chronic
illnesses.180 As a testament to the importance of this decision, the National
Legislative Association on Prescription Drugs sent a letter to the Supreme
Court just before Actavis was decided, urging the Court to find reverse
payments anticompetitive, as “‘few cases before the Supreme Court this
session could have more direct impact on consumers’ pocketbooks’ than
this one.”181
A. What Actavis Means for Consumers
The Actavis decision should result in a decrease in anticompetitive
reverse payment agreements, which will increase consumer access to
178. See Wright, supra note 146, at 15.
179. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Hits Drug Companies’ Profit-sharing Deals, USA
TODAY, June 17, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/17/supremecourt-brand-generic-drug-profit-sharing-deals/2178489/.
180. See Press Release, AARP Reacts to Supreme Court Decision on Pay-for-Delay,
AARP (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/press-center/info-062013/AARP-Reacts-to-Supreme-Court-Decision-on-Pay-for-Delay.html (summarizing a
statement by an AARP senior Vice President who proclaimed that “[t]he Court’s decision
recognizes that pay for delay arrangements may violate antitrust laws. Making sure
prescription drugs are available and affordable for consumers is critical to our nation’s
health care system”).
181. See Nat’l Leg. Assoc. on Prescription Drug Prices, Nlarx Signs Letter To Supreme
Court Seeking Action To Stop "Pay For Delay" Deals Hike Drug Costs, Reduce Access,
NLARX (June 16, 2013), http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read_nlarxnews.asp?news=6770
(quoting a previous statement made by the Boston Globe Editorial Board).
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generic drugs. The decision provides the FTC with more room to
aggressively challenge reverse payment settlements, and the FTC has
indicated that it intends to do so.182 Actavis also creates more uncertainty in
patent infringement litigation, possibly deterring such litigation from taking
place.183 However, there is a possibility that drug manufacturers could shift
toward other, more discrete means of settlement in an attempt to avoid
antitrust scrutiny.
The Actavis decision makes it easier for the FTC to bring an antitrust
claim against drug manufacturers. Practitioner Amanda Reeves believes
this to be true because the threshold for pleading a reverse payment case
under rule of reason is relatively low, making it more difficult for
defendants to prevail on a motion to dismiss.184 In some circumstances, the
FTC may even be able to survive a 12(b)(6) motion if the manufacturers
offer evidence that their settlement is not anticompetitive. The Actavis
Court noted that while although “a reverse payment [may reflect] traditional
settlement considerations,” this possibility “does not justify dismissing the
FTC’s complaint.”185 This is particularly true where “the settlement
includes both a payment that exceeds litigation costs and a provision for
delayed entry.”186
Reverse payments, and thus patent infringement litigation, may also
become less prevalent because litigation may be perceived as riskier to the
parties post-Actavis. Settling parties will face increased uncertainty in
determining whether courts will find their agreement unlawful. Initially,
parties will only be able to speculate as to how the size of the settlement
will fit in to district courts’ rule of reason analysis and what specific
mitigating factors defendants will be able to use to prove that their

182. See Pay-For-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comp. Pol’y, and Consumer Rights 113th Cong. 3
(2013)
(statement
of
the
Federal
Trade
Commission),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statementfederal-trade-commission-pay-delay-deals-limiting-competition-and-costing/130723pay
fordelay.pdf (stating that in light of Actavis, the Commission will continue to challenge payfor-delay settlements and re-investigate settlements previously filed with the Commission).
183. See infra notes 184–187 and accompanying text.
184. See Amanda P. Reeves, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and
Unintended Consequences Following FTC v. Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 9, 13 (Fall 2013)
(noting that “[r]ule of reason cases typically are very hard to defeat at a motion to dismiss
stage”).
185. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
186. Reeves, supra note 184, at 13.
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agreements are lawful.187 There is also uncertainty about the likelihood that
the FTC will investigate the settlement and attempt to block it before its
inception. 188 Although the Court granted the FTC more power to challenge
these settlements and the FTC has stated it intends to use this power, it is
more likely that the FTC will challenge only those agreements that are
clearly anticompetitive.189 But now that every reverse payment agreement is
open to challenge, drug manufacturers might be more hesitant to enter into
these agreements in the first place.
Drug manufacturers may attempt to avoid the Actavis decision by
using means of compensation other than cash. Although the Actavis
decision provides guidelines on how lower courts should address monetary
reverse payments, it does not give guidance on how courts should assess the
legality of “non-monetary” reverse payments. In some situations, the brand
name manufacturer does not provide monetary compensation to the
generic.190 Instead the parties may engage in an ancillary business
transaction such as a cross-licensing or supply agreement.191 For example,
in In re Nexium Litigation,192 a generic manufacturer, in exchange for an
agreement to delay entry was provided an exclusive license to distribute the
branded product instead of being paid in cash.193 Lower courts are split as to
whether Actavis’ definition of “reverse payment” should be read to include
any transfer of value between the parties. The Nexium court held that a
payment need not be in money to constitute an antitrust violation under the
Actavis Court’s framework.194 Instead, the court did “not see fit to read into
187. Id. at 14 (noting that litigants will face uncertainty as the courts and the FTC
decided how to use the size of the payment in reverse payment analysis).
188. See id. (arguing that Patent IV settlements will be riskier for manufacturers
because it is hard to determine “whether the FTC will sue to block a settlement, sending the
parties into years of costly litigation and follow-on private class actions (which is harder to
predict)”).
189. See id. (arguing that the FTC will reserve its power by going after only the most
egregious reverse payments because they do not want to risk losing a challenge and creating
bad law).
190. See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 375 (listing a number of settlement agreements
that include provisions other than cash payments).
191. See id.
192. See In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., CIV.A. 12-MD-02409, 2013
WL 4832176 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs pled facts sufficient at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to establish violations of the Sherman Act where the brand name
entered into a “no-authorized generic” agreement with a generic manufacturer in lieu of a
cash payment).
193. Id. at *6.
194. Id. at *15.
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the opinion a strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based
arrangements alone,” thus concluding drug manufacturers cannot avoid
liability by payments in kind.195 However, the court in In re Lamictal Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation196 held that Actavis should be read to only
apply reverse payment agreements where the consideration for delayed
entry is monetary.197 The Lamictal court reasoned that the Supreme Court
deliberately distinguished reverse payments from “traditional” and
“commonplace” forms of settlement.198 The Lamictal court also stated that
the definition of “reverse payment” used in Actavis was not meant to
include every situation where the patent holder confers a financial benefit
on the generic.199
Although there will likely be considerable debate in the future as to
how Actavis will be applied to non-monetary compensation agreements,
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements that are not enshrined in an
express agreement will inevitably make it more difficult for the FTC to
prove anticompetitive conduct.200 The possibility of non-monetary reverse
payments introduces the risk that drug manufacturers will find clever ways
around the Actavis holding by “hiding” their settlement agreements in more
benign arrangements.201 It therefore seems likely that reverse payment
agreements will continue to exist and be challenged by the FTC.
B. The Likelihood of Congressional Action
If the Court’s decision in Actavis is not enough to eliminate the
negative impact of reverse payment agreements on consumers altogether,
another option is congressional action. As discussed above, there have been
195. Id.
196. See In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-cv-995, 2014 WL
282755, at *11 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
197. See id. (holding that an agreement between two drug manufacturers whereby the
patentee gave the generic the right to enter the market early along with a promise that they
could do so without competition survives Actavis scrutiny because it did not involve a
monetary payment).
198. Id. at *7.
199. Id.
200. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 14 (“Proving a pay for delay
when there is no express agreement is like trying to prove a conspiracy from circumstantial
evidence: it’s possible to do but it’s never easy.”).
201. See id. (“This difficulty will exist even if all payments by branded to generic
providers are banned, as more indirect means of payment will inevitably be devised to
circumvent this prohibition.”).
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several bills introduced by the both the 112th and 113th Congresses aimed
at eliminating anticompetitive reverse payments.202 Although congressional
action is likely necessary to further limit the opportunity for parties to enter
into anticompetitive agreements, any law passed must be careful not to
upset the Actavis Court’s determination that some reverse payments can
have procompetitive effects, or at the very least do not have an adverse
effect on competition.
For this reason, Sen. Klobuchar’s PAAG Act will likely fail.203 The
Actavis Court unequivocally stated that reverse payments should not be
deemed presumptively illegal.204 The PAAG Act has been heavily criticized
because it essentially deems all reverse payments per se unlawful. It would
thus eliminate those reverse payment agreements that are conducted to
compensate parties for litigation costs.205 Also, deeming reverse payments
per se illegal runs contrary to the established antitrust principle that per se
illegality should apply to conduct only when courts have had sufficient
experience with a certain type of conduct and determined that it is almost
always anticompetitive.206 And given that this bill has been introduced and
rejected in the past, it seems unlikely to pass at present.207 This is especially
true after the Actavis decision, as Congress is now more likely to see how
the decision will play out in the lower courts before deciding that further
legislation is necessary.208 Sen. Klobuchar has stated that she intends to go
forward with the bill, but the Court’s decision in Actavis essentially makes
the key provisions of her bill moot.

202. See discussion supra Part V.
203. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009) (died in
committee and reintroduced as S. 27 on January 25, 2011).
204. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (stating that the complexities of
reverse payments, “lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-ofreason cases”).
205. See Picht, supra note 145, at 129 (noting that the Court in Actavis stated reverse
payments that are compensation for litigation costs are not anticompetitive).
206. See id. at 130 (“[I]t is a longstanding principle of U.S. antitrust law that per se
rules should be established only if sufficient experience has proven that a particular type of
conduct is almost always and to an overwhelming extent anticompetitive.”).
207. See Peter Levitas, Post-Actavis, Pay-for-Delay Debate is Far From Over, LAW360
(Dec. 18, 2013, 10:38 PM), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Post%
20Actavis%20Pay%20For%20Delay%20Debate%20Is%20Far%20From%20Over_Law360.pdf
(arguing that after Actavis, “it will be difficult for this legislation to move forward”).
208. See id. (“Members of Congress will likely be receptive to the argument that after
Actavis, even more than previously, it makes sense to wait and see how this issue plays out
in the courts.”).
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A more promising Congressional bill is Sen. Franken’s proposed FAIR
Generics Act.209 Research has shown that the anticompetitive effects of
reverse payment settlements are increased when the settlement is with the
first filer and the first filer does not relinquish its right to the 180-day
exclusivity period.210 Under the provisions of the FAIR Generics Act, any
generic manufacturer that wins a patent challenge in the district court or is
not sued by a brand-name drug manufacturer can share the first filer’s 180day exclusivity period.211 This would ultimately increase the number of
generics allowed to enter. Some, including the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association, argue that the FAIR Generics Act will result in countervailing
anticompetitive effects.212 They fear that removing the 180-day exclusivity
period will remove the incentive for generics to challenge weak patents thus
eliminating the “checks and balances” built into the Hatch-Waxman Act.213
This will allow weak or invalid patents to survive, ultimately reducing the
number of generics entering the market where patent protection should not
exist.
But a strong argument can be made that this bill has the potential to
end the “unintended, structural flaw in” the Hatch-Waxman Act: “parked
exclusivities” that block generic introduction.214 It also has the potential to
actually increase the incentive for generics to introduce new versions of
drugs into the market. If the exclusivity period could be shared by a number
of generic manufacturers, there is nothing stopping generic manufacturers
209.
210.

FAIR Generics Act, S. 504, 113th Cong. (2013).
See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 371 (2010) (citing FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 3
(2002)).
211. Generics and Biosimiliars Initiative, FAIR Generics Act Could Remove 180-day
Exclusivity, GABI (Nov. 25, 2011), http://gabionline.net/Policies-Legislation/FAIRGenerics-Act-could-remove-180-day-exclusivity (hoping that “[t]his new incentive structure
would end the pay-to-delay problem and bring less expensive generics to market sooner”).
212. Claire Sheahan, GPhA Supports Bill to Block Authorized Generic and Restore the
Value of the 180-day Generic Exclusivity Period, GPHA (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media/press/gpha-supports-bill-to-block-authorized-genericsand-restore-the-value-of-the-180-day-generic-exclusivity-period (arguing that allowing more
generics to enter the market during the 180-day exclusivity period would decrease the
incentive for generics to produce drugs and therefore decrease competition in the drug
market).
213. Id.
214. See 157 Cong. Rec. S7, 616–17 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman) (arguing that this proposed bill will reduce instances where the first filer “parks”
itself in the exclusivity period by not bringing a competing drug to market, therefore
increasing generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry).
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who are not first filers to also challenge potentially weak or invalid patents
and thus enter the market sooner.215 Therefore, passage of the FAIR
Generics Act or a similar bill has the greatest potential of increasing generic
entry into the market without holding all reverse payment settlements
presumptively unlawful.
C. The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on the Adverse Effects of Reverse
Payments
The Courts decision in Actavis will likely reduce the number of
harmful reverse payment agreements drug manufacturers enter into. For
those agreements that survive, poor and elderly consumers will be further
insulated from inflated drug prices due to the enactment of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA).216 The ACA expands Medicaid coverage to an estimated
17 million additional low-income adults and children.217 Congress also
expects the expansion program to provide cost savings for states that
choose to implement the expansion program in the form of reduced
healthcare spending for the uninsured.218
The implementation of the ACA also helps reduce prescription drug
prices for the elderly. Several provisions of the ACA aim at reducing drug
costs for seniors. Under the ACA, Medicare patients with a gap in drug
coverage will receive a one-time $250 rebate to help pay for prescription
drugs.219 Further, brand name drug companies will be forced to provide a
50% discount on drugs for seniors who face a gap in coverage.220 Expanded
drug coverage should increase the level of drug use and the probability of

215. See id. (“The legislation also maximizes the incentive for all generic challengers to
fight to bring products to market at the earliest possible time by holding generic settlers to
the deferred entry date agreed to in their settlements.”).
216. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
217. MICHELLE GREENHALGH, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: MEDICAID EXPANSION & HEALTHCARE EXCHANGES 6 (2013), available
at http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/coverage/aca/ES-MedicaidExpansion.
pdf.
218. Id.
219. Robert F. Rich et al., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010:
Implementation Challenges in the Context of Federalism, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 77,
82 (2013).
220. Id. at 83.
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receiving prescription drugs is expected to increase among elderly
Americans.221
With this dramatic increase in insurance coverage, fewer Americans
will be paying for their prescription drugs out-of-pocket.222 Therefore,
while the health insurer must still pay near monopoly prices for patented
drugs, consumers are only required to pay a price closer to its competitive
market value through their co-pay.223 The result of the introduction of the
ACA in relation to reverse payment settlements will be a shift in the
“deadweight loss” created by monopoly pricing from the consumer to the
private or public health insurer.224 So as anticompetitive reverse payments
may continue to be a problem for Medicaid and Medicare, they should have
less of a direct impact on newly insured poor and elderly consumers under
the ACA.
IX. Conclusion
Congress intended the Hatch-Waxman Act “to make available more
low cost generic drugs . . . .”225 Reverse payment settlement agreements
frustrate this purpose, as they provide incentives for drug manufacturers to
conspire rather than compete.226 Those reverse payment agreements that
have an adverse effect on competition disproportionately burden older

221. See Soonim Huh et al., supra note 4, at 828 (“[A]fter controlling for possible
selection bias, drug coverage significantly increases both the probability of receiving
prescription drugs and the level of drug use.”).
222. See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance Expansions and
Pharmaceutical Markets, 14 HARV. HEALTH AND POL’Y REV. 17, 17 (Spring 2013), available
at http://hhpronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Sood1.pdf (expecting “the quantity of
prescription drugs sold [to] increase, as newly insured consumers are likely to have lower
out-of-pocket costs . . .”).
223. See Anup Malani, A Different Perspective on Reverse Payment Settlements, BILL
OF HEALTH (Jan. 26, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/01/26/a-differentperspective-on-reverse-settlements/.
224. Id.
225. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (June 21, 1984).
226. See Barriers to Generic Entry: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 109th
Cong. 11 (2006) (statement by the Federal Trade Commission), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-generic-drug-entry/p052103barrierstogenericentrytestimonysenate07202006
.pdf (“By increasing the likelihood of generic entry, however, the statute also increases the
incentive for brand and generic manufacturers to conspire to share, rather than compete for,
the expected profits generated by sales of both brand and generic drugs.”).
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Americans and those who are uninsured.227 These populations bear the
brunt of the negative effects because they are the most likely to live on
fixed incomes and need prescription drugs to treat chronic medical
conditions. Actavis was the Court’s attempt to reestablish the purpose for
which Hatch-Waxman was enacted by narrowing a loophole that runs
contrary to its intent. Although it is too early to tell, Actavis should reduce
the number of anticompetitive reverse payments, increasing the number of
generics available to the people who need them the most. This decision,
along with expanded Medicaid coverage under the ACA, promises to
reduce the number of people in our population whose health is deteriorating
despite the fact that there are helpful medications available.

227. See id. (stating that older Americans, typically those in greatest need of health care
in our population and often living on fixed incomes, bear a disproportionate share of
increased healthcare costs).

